BATTLE OF LITTLE BIGHORN

"....The chiefs of the Ogalala and the Brule Sioux were still unsatisfied at the time of the treaties of October, 1865, but the defection of these powerful tribes of the confederacy was not deemed very serious by the Government or by the country at large. On December, 1866, President Johnson in his second annual message to Congress said: "Treaties have been concluded with the Indians, who, enticed into armed opposition to our Government at the outbreak of the rebellion, have unconditionally submitted to our authority and manifested an earnest desire for a renewal of friendly relations."

Subsequent events, and indeed events occurring while the President's message was being read to Congress, showed that the Chief Executive and the people were not justified in their belief that complete serenity reigned on the frontier. The reason why the Ogalala and the Brule were not represented at the treaty making of 1865 is apparent. Gold had been discovered in Idaho and Montana, and the miners demanded better highways. Congress had passed a bill on March 1, 1865, providing for a road from the California trail near Fort Laramie to Bozeman, Montana by way of the head-waters of the Tongue, Powder, and Bighorn rivers - in other words, authorizing the building of a road protected by military posts in the midst of the best buffalo hunting country available to these two tribes.

Spotted Tail of the Brules and Red Cloud of the Ogalala were now powerful and dominating chiefs, and with others were quick to see what the new roads meant. The Buffalo furnished food, clothing, shelter, and materials for barter; without them suffering was inevitable, and the herds could not exist in a land of roads and forts. This was the fate that stared the Teton in the face. During 1865 they argued with the surveying parties and sought to intimidate them. After these experiences Spotted Tail and Red Cloud declined to attend the treaty council in October and even refused to have their bands represented.

Those in the Indian country knew the true situation. Spotted Tail had always been friendly, and it was believed a treaty could be successfully negotiated. A commission headed by E.B. Taylor assembled at Fort Laramie on June 1, 1866, and in response to the invitation, two thousand Brules and Ogalala assembled.The object of the commission was to insure peace and arrange for the authorized road. The Indians who who did not use the lands in question were ready and willing to sign, but those directly concerned stubbornly refused. Even while these negotiations were in progress, Colonel Henry B. Carrington arrived in Fort Laramie with seven hundred men and armed with instructions to build the road and the forts. Thereupon Red Cloud and Man Afraid Of His Horses, convinced that their rights were to be ignored, left the council grounds with their bands of Ogalala. Spotted Tail and Swift Bear with twelve hundred Brule and Ogalala, at the insistence of Agent Maynadier went south of the Platte in order that they might be segregated as friendly.

From the first day of July to December 21, 1866, Red Cloud and his warriors killed ninety-one private soldiers, five officers, and fifty eight citizens, besides inflicting other injury and damage. Most of this mortality was the result of a single battle and was due to Captain Fetterman's temerity quite as much as to the skill of Red Cloud and his warriors. Colonel Carrington had proceeded to lay out his road and to establish forts in accordance with his instructions. Though the Indian warriors outnumbered the troops, they at first contented themselves with harrying the flanks of the little army and snuffing out the lives of those who ventured within the danger line.

But the building of Fort Phil.Kearny, on Piney Creek, a tributary of Powder river, in the very heart of buffalo country, was more stoutly resisted, and it became necessary to send a strong guard with each supply-train. Skirmishes were frequent, but Colonel Carrington was cautious and vigilant with his slender command. The younger men, especially Captain Fetterman, chafed under the restraint. On December 21, 1866, Fetterman, with with eighty picked men, was sent to rescue a besieged wood train. Violating his strict orders by giving chase to the Indians, he was drawn into a trap, and every man of his command was slain, stripped, mutilated. After such a bloody victory the Indians expected the soldiers to make a desperate attempt at retaliation; consequently they hastily withdrew and separated into small bands, but continued their watchful work with small parties about the forts of Phil. Kearny, C.F. Smith, and Reno. In the spring and early summer of 1867 the military posts received some needed reinforcements, with ammunition and better arms. The garrisons, momentarily expecting an attack, remained close to their forts and guns. As the time drew near for laying in a supply of fuel, arrangements were made with civilian contractors under promise of military protection.

This plan gave rise to one of the most remarkable battles in Indian history-sometimes called Wagon-box Fight.

Captain James W. Powell detailed to guard the wood cutters at Fort Phil.Kearny, found that they had two camps, about a mile apart. To one camp he detailed twelve men, and to the other thirteen, each squad under a non commissioned officer. This left him twenty-six men, with Lieutenant John C. Jenness, and with these he built a shelter in the midst of the plain in reach of the two camps by arranging the bodies of his wagons as a rude barricade. Indians had seen skulking in the neighborhood, but there was nothing to indicate that a serious attack was about to be made. The fact is that Red Cloud had determined to crush Fort Phil. Kearny, and to begin by capturing the wood-train. The first active operation on the part of the Indians in this direction was to stampede the mules, which was done on the morning of August 2. The choppers and the outside guard were rescued largely through the bravery of Captain Powell, who drew the Indians from the attack on the woodsmen and then retired into his wagon-box corral, while the others with the choppers escaped to the fort. Four civilians had joined Powell's little command, bringing the total to thirty-two men, well armed with breech loading rifles and having abundant ammunition. The best marksmen were to use the rifles, while the others loaded them. After the woods-camps had been plundered and destroyed, the Indians gathered to exterminate the wagon-box party. There were more than three thousand warriors, and the women and children assembled on the hills to witness the extermination of the little band.

A force of five hundred warriors, magnificently equipped and mounted, dashed toward the corral. Powell ordered his men to remain silent until the Indians were within fifty yards; then the firing commenced. The execution was terrible. Indians had never faced such guns before. Their line reeled, many dropped to the earth, and the survivors scurried back to the main body, where Red Cloud began another movement by sending out a swarm of sharpshooters to prepare the way for another attack. Six charges were made, each time with dire result to the Indian. Dismayed and alarmed, the living began the work of recovering the dead, cowed for the nonce, moved from the field, reinforcements arriving from the fort, and Powell's men were escorted to safety. In the first charge Lieutenant Jenness and one soldier had been killed and two soldiers wounded. This was the extent of the losses by the troopers. Captain Powell estimated that he had killed sixty-seven and wounded one hundred and twenty, while his men asserted that the Sioux had lost from three to five hundred. The Indians themselves are usually reticent as to the extent of their losses in this engagement, and when they do speak of it their statements conflict. The exact number will never be known.

Even before this clash at arms Congress had come to realize that everything was not peaceful on the northern frontier, in spite of the Edmunds treaties. By Act of Congress on July 20, 1867, a peace commission was appointed, consisting of N.G.Taylor, J.B. Henderson, Generals Sherman, Harney, Sanborn, Terry, and Augur, and S.F. Tappan. The commission met in St. Louis on August 6 and organized. Word was sent to Red Cloud that the commission would meet him and the other chiefs at Fort Laramie on September 13, and there hold a council. But the crafty chief and his followers were not in haste to end the war; indeed they made attacks from time to time in the vicinity of the objectionable forts until the middle of December, with the result that the Montana road was utterly impassible and the forts were practically useless.

Swift Bear, a friendly Brule, was the emissary from the commission to Red Cloud. The summons not meeting the favor of the hostiles, Swift Bear on his own account promised them that if they would come in, ammunition would be furnished to enable them to kill their winter's game. Proceeding to Fort Laramie, the commissioners received Swift Bear's report and were informed that the hostiles would not meet them in council until November. When this time arrived, Red Cloud sent word that his hostility against the whites was for the purpose of preserving the valley of Powder river for his people, and that when the troops were withdrawn from the forts the war on his part would cease. The commissioners then dispatched a messenger to Red Cloud asking for a truce until the council could be held, to which the Sioux leader, with his customary indefiniteness, replied that he would meet them in the following spring or summer.

The commissioners returned to Fort Laramie early in 1868, and by April 29, a treaty had been formulated. Many of the Brule and Ogalala chiefs, including Spotted Tail and Man Afraid Of His Horses, signed in April and May. Red Cloud, however, again sent word that he would wait until the garrisons were withdrawn from the forts. The commissioners advised the Government to submit to the chief's demands, and on August 27 the posts were abandoned in accordance with the provisions of the new treaty. Red Cloud then took time to accumulate a supply of buffalo meat, which caused much fear that the war was not yet ended; but on November 6 he appeared at Fort Laramie and signed the treaty, which was ratified by the Senate on February 16 and proclaimed by the President on February 24, 1869. The Red Cloud war was ended and the Indian victory was complete.

This famous treaty of 1868 was impossible of complete fulfillment, and its violations were due the wars with the Lakota that followed. The enormous reservation created under the treaty provisions consisted of that portion of the present State of South Dakota lying west of the Missouri river. As the white settlers crowded and clamored for more lands it would have been difficult, but still possible for the Government to keep faith by preserving that great empire to the Indians, and it likewise would have been possible to keep faith in the agreement as to annuities in money and goods, and in services proffered for their civilization. But the most impractical article of the treaty, which reads as follows, marked the climax of Red Cloud's victory.

Thus was the valuable game-preserve apparently saved to the Indians; but its conservation as such was of brief duration. The withdraw of this stipulated protection and the disappearance of the game provoked disturbances that continued at intervals until the fighting strength of the Lakota had been completely overcome.

In the summer of 1870 Red Cloud and Spotted Tail, with others, made a visit to Washington, where it was agreed to move Spotted Tail's agency back from Whetstone, away from the evil influences of the Missouri river settlements, while Red Cloud was promised for his people an agency near Fort Laramie. They were taken to New York, where at Cooper Union Red Cloud was honored with a remarkable reception.

The survey of the Northern Pacific Railroad route aroused further hostility, and the year 1872 witnessed a number of lesser encounters about Fort Abraham Lincoln, opposite Bismark. In March, 1873 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs appointed the Reverend J.P. Williamson and Dr. J.W. Daniels to investigate the troubles. They found the hostiles near the Red Cloud agency, and in May held a council with delegates from the Hunkpapa, Miniconjou, and San Arcs, when it was learned that the Indians were poorly armed and equipped, but that they strongly, and it may be added, rightfully, opposed the presence of the railroad and the white men on their lands.

General Philip H. Sheridan, in command of the Department of the Missouri, determined to end the conflict by establishing a fort in the Black Hills. To that end he visited Fort Laramie late in 1873, but found the Indians there so opposed to the plan that he gave up Laramie in favor of Fort Abraham Lincoln as the proposed base. He then ordered General Terry to fit out an expedition under Colonel George A. Custer to explore the Black Hills, a preceding in distinct violation of the treaty of 1868. Custer's glowing report brought forward many bold spirits anxious to obtain a footing in such a promising region, and especially to begin operations on the gold deposits suggested in this report; but this gold fever was checked by orders from General Sheridan to General Terry to prevent white people from entering Indian lands.

In March 1875, Professor Walter P. Jenney conducted a geological reconnaissance of the Black Hills under the protection of Lieutenant R.I. Dodge with a guard of four hundred men, and reported the finding of gold. A commission was appointed, headed by W.B. Allison, to treat with the Indians for the possession of these lands, but long and patient argument resulted in failure. Venturesome prospectors were now pouring into the Black Hills, and by March 1876, eleven thousand white men had gathered in Custer City. The Indians believed that the only way by which they could preserve their rights was to make war.

During all this time Crazy Horse, American Horse, Gall, and Sitting Bull were maintaining themselves in the buffalo country along Powder river. Red Cloud and Spotted Tail remained at their agencies, but the warriors slyly slipped away, ostensibly on buffalo hunting expeditions, which they had a perfect right to do under their treaty. In December the agents were instructed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to send runners to all the Indians, enjoining their return by the end of January; if they failed to obey, they were to be treated as hostiles. The cruelty of this order is manifest from the reported sufferings of the soldiers in the wintry blasts of the northern plains, and yet the Indians were commanded to move their woman and children with scant food and protection. The runners brought back word that the Indians were well-disposed and had promised to return by early spring.

Nevertheless, on February 1, 1876, the Secretary of War was notified that the Indians refusing to return to the agencies were deemed hostile and from that time were to be dealt with by the military. The Officers, basing their calculations on reports from the Indian agents at the various reservations, concluded that not more than five to eight hundred warriors could possibly be encountered, but in reality probably five thousand were engaged in the battle of the Little Bighorn later in the year. General Crook was instructed to reduce the hostiles to subjection. General Sheridan, still commanding the Department of the Missouri, planned to converge three columns-one under Crook from Fort Fetterman, northwestward, one from Terry from Fort Abraham Lincoln, southwestward, and one under Gibbon from Fort Ellis, southeastward. In March, with a force of eight hundred and three men, Crook had scouted the Rosebud region by way of the old Bozeman trail. The most important result was the destruction of Crazy Horse's camp, the Indians themselves escaping to the hills.

Crook with a force of ten hundred and forty-nine officers and men left Fort Fetterman on May 29, and on June 17 fought with Crazy Horse the all-day engagement known as the battle of Rosebud, which resulted in a victory for the Indians. Crook fell back to await reinforcements, and Crazy Horse, without following up his advantage, left the field and rejoined Sitting Bull on the Little Bighorn.

Terry moved out of Fort Abraham Lincoln on May 17 with a force of six hundred cavalry and four hundred infantry. He met the steamboats with supplies at the mouth of Powder river on June 9, and preceded up the mouth of the Rosebud, where on June 21 he received scouts from Gibbon, who had arrived from Fort Ellis with four hundred and fifty men. Terry detached Custer and sent him on a scout up the Rosebud, while he took the steamers to ferry across Gibbon's force, which was to go up the Bighorn to effect a junction with Custer.

Custer with eight hundred and fifty men and Indian scouts and guides started up the Rosebud on June 22. Early in the morning of the twenty-fourth, while the Custer command was passing up the Rosebud, scouts who were well in advance, saw a few Sioux scouts or hunters. Later in the day they reported to Custer that they had seen these men and that the Sioux had crossed over to the valley of the Little Bighorn. Custer seemed a little excited, and instructed the scouts to go first to the mountains forming the divide between the Rosebud an the Little Bighorn. The sun was now very low, and the scouts followed with the command following. In the scouting party were Lieutenant Barnum, Mitch Boyer, the five Crow scouts-White Man Runs Him, Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasins, White Swan, and Paints Half His Face Yellow-a half-breed, and some Arikara. The scouting party followed up the Rosebud until he reached a small creek that heads in the mountains. They followed this stream, almost reaching the summit of the divide before daylight. Here they lay down to rest. At approaching dawn Boyer and White Man Run Him left the others asleep and went to a high point on the summit, usually referred to as the Crow's Nest. Far below them and to the west spread the Little Bighorn valley, over which hung a mist like cloud-and smoke from large Indian encampment. The Crow called to the others to ascend. Varnum or Boyer sent a note by Red Star, an Arikara scout, to Custer, who by that time had ascended close to the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn. When Red Star came hurriedly to Custer, he was asked by the latter in sign "Have you seen the Cutthroats (Sioux)?" On receiving the scouts reply, Custer read the note, and then with four or five men road at once to Crow's Nest, from which vantage he studied the distance for some time and viewed the encampment with its great herd of horses on the hills beyond.

This outlook, which affords a splendid view of the entire region is about fifteen miles at the head of Davis creek, which flows into the Rosebud, and Middle Reno creek, which empties into the Little Bighorn. The creek flowing down to the Little Bighorn stretches clearly before one, and much of the Sioux encampment was plainly in sight.

Custer discussed with his scouts the situation, the nature of the ground and the best route to follow, and then road back to his command, which was just below him to the right. In the early forenoon the command moved down the western slope of Wolf mountains and out of the plain, and thus began the most unfortunate day ever experienced by United States troops in Indian warfare. Before leaving the summit one Crow scout, Hairy Moccasins, was sent ahead to scan the ground and obtain a closer view of the village. Preceding down the valley, past the oft-mentioned death-lodge of the Sioux, he climbed a pine-clad hill near the junction of the middle and north branches of Reno creek, observing the Sioux everywhere across the Little Bighorn, and a few, who were presumably Sioux scouts, in the valley of Reno creek. Hairy Moccasins rode back and reported the size and position of the Sioux encampment, and said that the hostiles were not running away, as had been thought. On receiving this report Custer hurried the command down the valley and halted at the junction of the two forks on a fair-sized flat, now, as it probably was then, a prairie dog village.

This is where Custer and Reno separated.

Reno advanced down the valley at its left margin. He had with him as scouts White Swan, Paints Half His Face Yellow, both Crows, and several Arikara. The distance from the point of separation as traveled by Reno to where he began his fight is, by the United States geological Survey, three and one-half miles.

With Custer were the Crow scouts, White Man Runs Him, Hairy Moccasins, Goes Ahead, and Curly, and Mitch Boyer as interpreter and scout. Custer's command bore off to the right down a sharp bank, across a narrow flat, then across a narrow cut of a dry creek and out on a rising plain, Custer with his staff and scouts in the lead and their horses at a gallop. The course was gradually up and out of Reno creek. Off to the left Reno's command was in full sight, moving down the valley almost within hailing distance. As Custer's command emerged from the valley it passed, for two or three minutes, from the sight of Reno's men, then came up close to the crest of the hill overlooking the valley. Just before reaching this crest-the distance is about a quarter of a mile-the command was halted and the scouts were sent ahead. They appeared at the top of the hill, riding along silhouetted against the sky, and signaling Custer to follow; he and his staff went at once to the summit.

When Custer reached this outlook, probably one-half or three-fourths of the Indian encampment was in plain view. Reno had already forded the river and was riding down the valley toward the Sioux camp. The distance from the point of separation to where Custer now stood on the outlook is one mile, and to where Reno was seen across the Little Bighorn beginning his march down the Valley, it was the same distance. From these points either or both commanders could have ridden into the Sioux camp in less than ten minutes. Custer stopped here, as the Indians expressed it, "only as a bird alights and then flies on."

The ground in general is a sharp ridge sloping abruptly toward the river on one hand and gently to the other, this easy slope ending in a draw, which from here to the point where the attack on Custer began parallels the river. The peculiar topography enabled Custer and his staff to keep close to the crest where they could have a full view of the valley, while at the same time the troops were entirely ignorant of what was in the valley on the other side of the ridge. Within one minute from Custer's starting from this first point of vantage he passed over the ground on which Reno's disordered force was later to make its stand.

Hugging the ridge for a time, Custer passed a hill and out in full view of the valley again. This last point is one of the highest in the region and gave a perfect view of the entire Indian encampment and the ground on which Reno made his attack.

Custer's route thence practically paralleled the valley for a distance, then turned to the left down a dry creek, by the Indians called Medicine Tail Coulee. Here he rode out close to the river, and probably planned to ford at this point and attack the Sioux. But the Indians had now discovered him and were gathered closely on the opposite side, and if the plan had been to cross, it was given up without an effort, even without going quite to the stream.

From here Custer turned slightly, led his command back up the valley a short distance, then swung to the left, and with Boyer and some of his staff dismounted and went out on a fairly high point overlooking the entire encampment.

At this time some Indians were crossing the river here and there, and others were stealthily creeping up in Custer's front. When Custer had reached this point, Reno's fight in the valley had closed, and his men, with those of Benteen, were together on the bluffs, so that the entire Sioux force was free to attack Custer. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, says:

According to the testimony of almost innumerable Sioux participants, this rush of warriors down the valley commenced when they had sighted Custer's command, and this was the beginning of their attack on him. Custer personally, while sitting there, shot at Indians who were reckless enough to come within range. Boyer sat at Custer's side and the Crow scouts were behind with the troops. Boyer called White Man Runs Him, who came up to them on his hands and knees, when Boyer said to him "You have done what you agreed to do-brought us to the Sioux camp; now go back to the pack-train and live." The scouts then mounted and rode away, and as they came in sight of the attacking Sioux, many shots were fired at them, but they were soon out of range. They say they did not ride hard very long, but as soon as well out of range proceeded more slowly and watched the fight. Theirs was only a distant view, hence they could give no details of the encounter. Custer mounted at the time the scouts left him and began his retreat, and it was at this point that seven bodies were found by the burying squad. None of these men had empty cartridges, which clearly indicates that they were killed in the first attack, before there had been any considerable firing by the troops.

"Custer made no attack, the whole movement being a retreat. Whether he thought only of withdrawing far enough back from the river to find a favorable position to make a stand, or had undertaken a long retreat to the mountains, cannot be told. The Sioux thought he was trying to reach the distant hills, and headed him off, forcing the retreat on a line more or less paralleling the river.

On June 27, two days after Custer's defeat, Terry arrived with Gibbon's men, forming a junction with Reno's force. They buried Custer's two hundred dead, gathered up Reno's wounded, and withdrew to the mouth of the Bighorn. The wounded were sent to Fort Abraham Lincoln, and Terry applied for reinforcements. Large additional forces were hurried to the front, but no considerable body of the Indians could be found; they were apparently satisfied for the time with their bloody victory, and had scattered, many going back to their reservations. The soldiers now adopted a policy of disarming and dismounting all of the Indians at the agencies. Colonel Miles, in pursuit of the fleeing Sioux north of the Yellowstone, had two parleys with Sitting Bull, Gall, and others. No understanding being reached, the chase was resumed. Five of the chiefs surrendered and were held as hostages, but Sitting Bull and Gall with their immediate bands escaped into Canada.

After the Custer battle Congress as well as the military authorities awakened to the seriousness of conditions among the Lakota. On August 15, 1876, an act was passed for the appointment of a new commission, and on August 24, the personnel was made up as follows: George W. Manypenny, Henry C. Bullis, Newton Edmunds, Bishop Henry B. Whipple, A.G. Boone, A.S. Gaylord, General H.H. Sibley, and Dr. J.W. Daniels. They prepared a treaty in advance, the main object was to secure the cession of the Black Hills. Many concessions and advantages were promised and an effort was to be made to move the Lakota into Indian territory. In violation of the Laramie treaty of 1868, no effort was made to obtain the consent of three-fourths of the adult males; but instead the treaty was first presented to the friendly Spotted Tail and his leaders, and then to the headman of the other bands separately. By the end of October all of the Lakota except the irreconcilable bands of Gall and Sitting Bull had signed. The Indian territory project was abandoned, and after discussing other localities without results the bands settled down to a prosaic existence on the reservations where their survivors are still living.

When Sitting Bull and Gall fled to Canada, Crazy Horse remained with his followers in the Bighorn mountains. During the winter General Cook learned that he was probably ready to surrender, and sent Spotted Tail, uncle of Crazy Horse, to bring him into camp. The emissary returned from the hills with nineteen hundred and seventeen Indians, and on May 6, 1877, Crazy Horse came in and surrendered with eight hundred and eighty-nine people and two thousand ponies. For this successful winter errand, Spotted Tail was recognized by the authorities as head-chief of all the Lakota and was accorded other honors. Crazy Horse remained at Fort Robinson under military surveillance, but became uneasy in the summer. Resisting arrest, he was bayoneted by a sentry and died, September 5, 1877.

Early in 1881 Gall, crossing the border into the United States with most of the Lakota that had fled into Canada, was speedily confronted by General Miles, and after a stubborn resistance he surrendered. He was taken to Fort Buford, and later to the Standing Rock agency, where he lived peaceably until his death December 5, 1894. In 1881 Sitting Bull surrendered at Fort Buford. After serving two years as a prisoner of war at Fort Randall, he too was taken to Standing Rock agency. It was the year of Sitting Bull's surrender that Spotted Tail was murdered by Crow Dog, a Brule sub-chief, as a result of a feud involving jealousy and politics...."